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Abstract 
 
A large body of literature finds that the energy sector is important to economic growth and 
development. The production of energy has negative environmental impacts, however, 
which has resulted in the sector being highly regulated. While several studies examine the 
effect of particular regulations on the energy sector, in this study we use the recently 
developed measure of regulation called RegData to estimate the impact of federal 
regulations on the energy sector. We employ a panel ARDL model to find an inverted U-
shaped relationship between federal regulations and U.S. energy sector output. Federal 
regulations appear to increase energy sector outputs at low levels and then decline as 
regulations accumulate.  
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Federal Regulations and U.S. Energy Sector Output 
 
1. Introduction 
In the United States, the Federal Register publishes, among other things, regulations. For example, the 
Federal Register contains federal agency rule and regulations, executive orders, and proclamations. The 
Code of Federal Registrar (CFR) contains the complete and official text of agency regulations organized 
into fifty titles covering broad areas of the economy such as the energy sector. These regulations are 
continuously updated and are rarely removed leading to an accumulation of regulations. The growth of 
regulations has led scholars to look at the impact of increasing federal regulations on factors such as 
economic growth (Dawson and Seater, 2013) and entrepreneurship (Goldschlag and Tabarrok, 2018). In 
this study, we focus on the impact that regulations have on output in the energy sector. 
We focus on the energy sector for two reasons. First, the energy sector is an important input to the 
rest of the economy. To the extent that the accumulation of regulations in a sector are reducing industry 
output, that should be quantified. In this respect our study is similar to, but more narrowly focused than, 
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) who find that environmental regulations reduced the annual growth rate of 
the U.S. economy by 0.191% from 1973 to 1985. Second, a finding that energy-sector regulations lead to 
reduced industry output would be consistent with the public-interest theory of regulation (Posner, 1974). 
The public interest theory of regulation states that regulation is supplied by government in order to protect 
the public from “inefficiencies and inequities in the operation of the free market” (Posner, 1974: 336). From 
this perspective, regulations are intentionally designed to increase the cost of the producing energy that 
generates negative externalities. A reduction in output in this case is consistent with an improvement in 
economic efficiency. The public-interest theory is contrasted with the special-interest theory of regulation 
(Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976), which states that special interests often distort regulations in order to 
positively affect industry. Croucher (2011), for example, argues that energy efficiency standards may be a 
form of regulatory capture that often require regulators to relinquish some control over price regulation, 
leading to more automatic and regular price changes without costly rate cases. A finding that energy 
 
 
regulations do not lower or actually increase industry output would be consistent with the special-interest 
theory of regulation.  
In the literature on the effect of regulations on firms and the economy there are essentially two 
strains of research. The first group is highly aggregated, looking at the effect of regulations on the economy 
as a whole (Nicoletti and Scarpeta, 2003; Dawson and Seater, 2013). The second group focuses on the 
effect of specific regulations, such as the Clean Air Act (Greenstone, 2002; Geltman et al., 2016; Hancevic, 
2016). Our study lies between these literatures in that we focus on one specific sector of the economy – the 
energy sector. While this prevents us from utilizing typical causal inference approaches to uncover the 
causality between regulatory policy and economic activity, it does allow us to capture the aggregate burden 
of regulation on the energy sector, unlike studies that examine specific policies. We are able to examine the 
cumulative regulations affecting the energy sector due to the recent creation of RegData, a database that 
quantifies federal regulations for various industries from 1997 to 2016 based on text analysis and machine 
learning (Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin, 2014). Combined with industry-level data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA), we find that an inverted U-shaped relationship between industry-level 
regulations and industry output. We interpret this empirical finding to mean that the special-interest effect 
dominates at low levels of regulatory activity, but that the accumulation of regulations means that as the 
regulatory burden increases the overall effect is to decrease output.  
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the data we use in detail, especially RegData, given its 
newness in the literature. Section 3 discusses our empirical approach, while Section 4 presents our results. 
Section 5 provides concluding remarks.  
 
2.  Data 
We gather the data of industrial outputs, real compensation rates and federal restrictions of various energy 
related industries from 1997 to 2016. The energy related industries are defined based on the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS).  NAICS is the standard used by federal statistical agencies in 
classifying business establishments for collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the 
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U.S. economy. Both the time period covered and use of NAICS is dictated by the time period and structure 
of our measure of regulations, RegData. The industry outputs, the rate of labor compensation and federal 
restriction of various energy related industries are therefore gathered based on their NAICS industry codes. 
We describe in detail what it means to be an energy-related industry and our data on industry output and 
compensation before describing RegData.  
2.1  Defining energy related industries 
The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) defines an industry to its broader sectoral 
classification. A sector is a collection of similar industries at various levels of aggregation. In this study, 
we define energy-related industries as Oil and Gas Extraction (NAICS 2111), Coal Mining (NAICS 2121), 
Support Activities for Mining (NAICS 2131), Electric Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution 
(NAICS 2211) and Natural Gas Distribution (NAICS 2212). The numbers in parentheses are each industry’s 
four digit NAICS codes. 
NAICS defines the mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction sector with two-digit code as 21. 
The Mining sector comprises establishments that extract naturally occurring mineral solids, such as coal 
and ores; liquid minerals, such as crude petroleum; and gases, such as natural gas. The term mining is used 
in the broad sense to include quarrying, well operations, beneficiating (e.g., crushing, screening, washing, 
and flotation), and other preparation customarily performed at the mine site, or as a part of mining activity. 
This sector consists of sub-sectors which are defined by the following three-digit NAICS codes: Oil and 
Gas Extraction (NAICS 211); Mining except Oil and Gas (NAICS 212), and Support Activities for Mining 
(NAICS 213). Each three-digit NAICS coded industry may contain more sub-sectors which are labelled 
with four-digit NAICS code. The NAICS are hierarchical up to six-digit depth.  
The Utilities sector comprises establishments engaged in the provision of the following utility 
services: electric power, natural gas, steam supply, water supply, and sewage removal. Within this sector, 
the specific activities associated with the utility services provided vary by utility: electric power includes 
generation, transmission, and distribution; natural gas includes distribution; steam supply includes 
provision and/or distribution; water supply includes treatment and distribution; and sewage removal 
 
 
includes collection, treatment, and disposal of waste through sewer systems and sewage treatment facilities. 
The utilities sector (NAICS 22) consists of a single subsector, Utilities defined as NAICS 221. The 
subsector consists of these industry groups: Electric Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution 
(NAICS 2211); Natural Gas Distribution (NAICS 2212), and Water, Sewage and Other Systems (NAICS 
2213). 
2.2  Industry outputs 
The U.S. Input-Output (I-O) Accounts, published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), provide 
supply and use tables. The supply table delivers a detailed elaboration of the total domestic supply of goods 
and services from both domestic and foreign producers while the use table shows the use of supply across 
the U.S. economy. These tables provide a detailed “internal workings of the U.S. economy” in terms of the 
flows of goods and services purchased by each industry (inter-industry transaction), the incomes generated 
from production in each industry, and the dissemination of sales for each commodity (Young et al., 2015). 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) manages the raw input-output data published by BEA. The BLS I-O 
matrices include the supply, use and final demand matrices of 205 different sectors from 1997 to 2016. 
Horowitz and Planting (2009) outline how to generate industry outputs, commodity outputs and final 
demand based on the supply and use tables provided by the BEA. Based on the approach of Horowitz and 
Planting (2009), we retrieved and managed the times-series data of industry outputs from 1997 to 2016 for 
our energy-related industries, measured are in millions of chain-weighted (2009) dollars. 
2.3  Real compensation  
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) website provides hierarchical legacy flat files which contains 
annual employment and average annual compensation for two-, three-, four-, five-, and six-digit level 
NAICS industries from 1990 to 2016. We obtained the number of employees and compensation (in millions 
of dollars) unit from 1997 to 2016 for our energy-related industries. Compensation was deflated using the 
personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
We define the real compensation rate as the ratio of deflated compensation to numbers employed by each 
energy-related industry. 
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2.4   Federal regulations 
To quantify the extent of regulations on the energy sector we employ the Industry-Specific Regulatory 
Constraint Database (RegData) created by Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2014). RegData quantifies federal 
regulations at the industry-level from 1997 to 2014 based on text analysis and machine learning. Their data 
has been subsequently updated through 2016, known as RegData 3.0 (McLaughlin and Sherouse, 2017). 
Recognizing that regulations place limits on the actions of individuals and organizations through language 
limiting what they can do, Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2014) count the number of ‘binding constraints 
words’ in the CFR. Since regulators typically use a relatively standard suite of verbs and adjectives to limit 
activities or require actions, Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2014) use five strings to quantify binding 
regulatory constraints: ‘shall’, ‘must’, ‘may not’, ‘prohibited’, and ‘required’. Their use of text analysis and 
machine learning allows for the creation of an index. 
RegData 3.0 quantifies federal regulations by industry and by regulatory agency for all federal 
regulations from 1997 to 2016 at the two-, three-, four-, five- and six-digit levels of NAICS. Although a 
relatively new index it has been used in a number of well-published papers (Malone and Chambers, 2017; 
Goldschlag and Tabarrok, 2018; Bailey et al., 2019; Chambers et al., 2019;) as it is the first non-survey 
measure of regulation to go beyond a simple word or page count. We utilize their annual industry relevant 
restriction index, which is defined as the industry relevance of a CFR part multiplied by the number of 
restrictions in that part, summed across all parts of the CFR (McLaughlin and Sherouse, 2017).  
2.5  Trends and descriptive statistics 
Trend diagrams and basic descriptive statistics of the natural logarithm of industrial output (INDit), the real 
compensation rate (RCRit), and industry relevant restriction index (IRRit) are given in Figure 1 and Table 
1. The top panel of Figure 1 shows that output in the oil and gas extraction sector has increased since 2005. 
The sectors other than oil and gas extraction have declined. The increase in the output of the oil and gas 
extraction sector can be attributed in part to the increase in shale gas production as the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 exempted fluids used in hydraulic fracking from protections under the Clean Water Act and the 
 
 
Safe Drinking Water Act.1  The second panel of Figure 1 shows a positive trend in the real compensation 
rates for all sectors, with the oil and natural gas extraction relatively higher than the others. The third panel 
of Figure 1 shows that regulations have increased in all energy sectors since 1997, but with sharp increases 
in the last decade in Natural Gas Distribution and Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and 
Distribution. During this period a number of federal legislative actions were undertaken, namely, the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, and the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009.   These legislative actions targeted our future energy security through greater 
access of our domestic energy sources along with expanding alternative energy sources.  In regards to 
electricity generation and transmission, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 increased electricity transmission 
with the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to issue federal permits to expand 
transmission capacity, known as the National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor, primarily in the mid-
Atlantic and southwest areas. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
3.  Methodology and Results  
In this study our goal is to analyze the impact of federal regulations on outputs related to the energy industry (INDit) with the industry relevant restriction index (IRRit) as our measure of federal regulations. 
Regulations, if enacted in the public interest, should act as a cost of doing business and thus lead to reduced 
industry output. If enacted for special interests, regulations can act like a barrier to entry and therefore lead 
to a positive effect on output for existing firms. It is possible, however, that even if individual regulations 
are not designed in the public interest but to protect special interests, overall regulations are reducing output. 
This is analogous to an income tax increase designed to pay for road construction having either a positive 
                                                 
1 In addition, exemptions from the Clean Air Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act were also a result of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
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or negative cost-benefit analysis depending on the current level of taxation.  We therefore hypothesize the 
following relationship: INDit = α0 + β1RCRit + β2IRRit + β3IRRit2 + εit           (1) 
By setting first order derivatives to zero, i.e. ∂INDit
∂IRRit
= β2 + 2β3IRRit = 0, and solving for the federal 
restriction yields IRRit∗ = −β22β3 . The IRRit∗  is the value of the federal restriction associated with the turning 
point value of industry output. A negative second order condition verifies industry output yields an inverted 
U-shaped relationship, where industry output increases with low levels of federal regulations but declines 
as regulations accumulate.  
Though traditional panel methods (fixed effects, random effects, etc.) are suitable for large numbers 
of observations, N, compared to observations across time, T, such methods come into question when T > 
N.  In such cases, traditional panel methods may produce spurious results as the temporal properties of 
variables may exhibit nonstationary properties. Given the regression of non-stationary variables produces 
spurious results, Baltagi (2008) offers two options to address this issue. The first is heterogeneous 
regressions for each individual to avoid the homogeneity of coefficients obtained with a single regression. 
The second is the application of time series processes to panels to address nonstationarity and cointegration 
among the variables.  
Several techniques exist to estimate the order of integration of variables in the panel data.2 The 
Levin et al. (2002, hereafter LLC) panel unit root test is an extension of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test using pooled data and given as: 
∆yit = ϕitψi + ρyit−1 + ∑ φijnjj=1 Δyit−j + υit             (2) 
                                                 
2 We only employed first general panel unit root tests for several reasons:  (1) these tests have power even with the 
smaller sample observation across time; (2) the use of first generation unit root methodology for identifying the order 
of integration of variables is not relevant in the panel ARDL approaches as long as the respective variables are I(1) 
and I(1) (Pesaran and Smith, 1995 and Pesaran et al. 1999); and (3) the pooled mean group technique considers the 
homogeneity among the cross-sections, therefore second generation unit root tests may not offer any significant 
advantages (Al Mamun et al. 2014).  
 
 
where ϕit includes individual deterministic components (such as fixed effect, trend, or a mixture of fixed 
effects and trend); ρ is the homogenous autoregressive coefficient across panels; υit is assumed to be 
independently, identically distributed and stationary residuals with zero mean and variance συ2; and n 
represents the lag order. The null hypothesis is that all the variables in the panel have a unit root, H0: ρ = 1, 
against the alternative that all the variables are stationary, H1: ρ < 1. 
Given the LLC panel unit root test can suffer loss of power due to the homogenous autoregressive 
coefficient across panels (Breitung, 2000). Im et al. (2003, hereafter IPS) allow for heterogeneity in the 
autoregressive coefficients for all panel units and is obtained as an average of individual ADF statistics. 
The IPS unit root test is given as: 
Δyit = ϕitψi + ρiyit−1 + ∑ φijΔyit−jnjj=1 + υit             (3) 
The null hypothesis of the IPS test is that all variables in the panel have a unit root, Ho: ρi = 1, against the 
alternative hypothesis that all the variables are stationary, Ho: ρi < 1. Note that the larger difference 
between the size of T and N or the inclusion of an individual deterministic trend can generate biased LLC 
and IPS tests. Unlike averaging individual test statistics as suggested by IPS, Choi (2001) employs a 
nonparametric panel unit root test that combine the p -value from individual unit root tests in using the 
Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP tests.   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 Table 2 reports the results of the LLC, IPS, along with the Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP unit root 
tests.  Across the panel unit root tests, the log of industry output, IND, appears integrated of order one, I(1), 
while the log of the real compensation rate, RCR, is integrated of order one based on the LLC results with 
the remaining panel unit root tests indicating integrated of order zero, I(0).  The log of the industry relevant 
restriction index, IRR, is integrated of order zero, I(0).  Given the orders of integration vary across the 
variables, we employ the Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran et al. (1999) panel ARDL methodology to 
examine the long-run relationship among the variables specified in Equation (1).   Pesaran and Shin (1999) 
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and Pesaran et al. (1999) demonstrate that the ARDL approach is not dependent on the endogeneity of the 
regressors or whether the underlying variables follow a I(0) or I(1) process.  
The panel ARDL model allows us to estimate an empirical model that encompasses both the short-
run and long-run effects. The ARDL model is given as: 
∆yit = θiECTit−1 + ∑ ∆Xit−jq−1j=0 βij + ∑ λijp−1j=1 Δyit−j + μit        (3) 
where yit is the dependent variable defined as the log of industrial outputs of energy related sectors; Xit−j 
is the regressors set; ECTit−1 = yit−1 − Xit−1θ is error correction term; and μit is the uncorrelated 
idiosyncratic errors.3 Two sets of regressors are contained in Xit−j include the log of real compensation 
rates and log of the industry relevant restriction index along with the squared term of the log of the industry 
relevant restriction index. The speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium is denoted by the 
coefficient estimate of θi, which is expected to be negative. Furthermore, a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient of the error-correction term also confirms the existence of cointegration. The short-
run dynamics are in turn captured by the coefficient estimates of βij and λij.  
The panel ARDL model can be estimated using two different estimators: the Mean Group (MG) 
estimator introduced by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator. The MG 
approach estimates a separate ARDL model for each group and averages the respective coefficients. 
Alternatively, the PMG estimator restricts the long-run parameters to be identical over the cross-section 
units but allows the intercepts, short-run coefficients, speed of adjustment, and error variances to differ 
across groups for the cross-section units.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
We use the PMG version of the panel ARDL model with the results shown in Table 3. The error 
correction model associated with Equation (1) reveals the error correction term is negative and statistically 
                                                 
3 The error correcting term is the residuals when yit is regressed on Xit.  
 
 
 
significant at the 5% level.  The statistical significance of the error correction term confirms the presence 
of a long-run equilibrium relationship between the log of energy sector outputs to the log of real 
compensation rates and log of industry relevant restriction along with the square of the log of industry 
relevant restrictions. The speed of adjustment toward long-run equilibrium is roughly 14.1% per year. In 
terms of the short-run estimates, only the real compensation rate is statistically significant at the 10 % level. 
The short-run impact of federal restrictions are statistically insignificant in the short-run, although the signs 
are consistent with an inverted U-shape relationship.  
With respect to the long-run estimates, both industry relevant restrictions and the real compensation 
rate are statistically significant at the 5% level.  Specifically, there appears to be a quadratic relationship 
between industry relevant restrictions and energy sector output. The results are consistent with federal 
regulations acting initially acting as a barrier to entry at lower levels leading to higher output, but eventually 
reducing output when the amount of restrictions in an industry accumulate. A 1% increase in the log of 
industry relevant restrictions increases industry output by 16.735%. The square of the log of industry 
relevant restriction index is negative and statistically significant. The coefficient of -0.851 on the square 
term implies that industry-relevant restrictions increases industry output until the log of the industry 
relevant restriction index reaches 9.833. Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution sector 
is currently above that range with Coal Mining close behind.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
We find an inverted U-shaped relationship between federal regulations and industry output in the energy 
sector. This finding is consistent with regulations acting as a barrier to entry at low levels, but in the long-
run the accumulation of regulations leads to reduced output. While our approach cannot provide causal 
evidence of the special-interest view of regulation, the results are not at all consistent with the public interest 
view of regulation.  The measure of federal regulations we employ is industry relevant restrictions from Al-
Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2017). Our empirical results suggest that federal regulations turn from having a 
positive impact on industry output to negative when the industry relevant restriction index reaches 9.833.  
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Our study contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, most studies of regulation on the 
energy sector are based on micro-level studies. Ours is the first, to our knowledge, to examine at the 
aggregate level the effect of regulations on the energy sector. Second, our study tests whether regulations 
in the energy sector are consistent with the public interest or special interest view of regulation. While we 
can only say our results are consistent with the special interest view of regulation, we can rule out the public 
interest view of regulation as regulations on the energy sector are positively associated with industry output 
for most of the output range, only turning negative at very high levels. Third, our empirical estimates show 
that the Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution energy sector is at the point where 
accumulated regulations are leading to lower industry output.  
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Figure 1. Trend Diagrams 
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Figrue 1.  Trend Diagrams 
(continued) 
 
 
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive Statistics     Mean         Median         Max        Min           SD        JB 
IND 
Oil and Gas Extraction     12.38        12.32      12.78       12.18         0.16      3.47 (0.18) 
Coal Mining       10.73        10.72             10.91       10.55         0.11      1.00 (0.61) 
Support Activities for Mining    11.09          11.16             11.46       10.57         0.22      0.57 (0.75) 
Electric Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution 12.65          12.64             12.93       12.52         0.10      4.17 (0.12) 
Natural Gas Distribution     11.55          11.51             11.88       11.35         0.15      2.03 (0.36) 
 
RCR 
Oil and Gas Extraction       4.82          4.90        5.00         4.47         0.18      2.24 (0.33) 
Coal Mining         4.24          4.25               4.35         4.12         0.08      2.22 (0.33) 
Support Activities for Mining      4.21            4.27               4.40         3.97         0.14      2.13 (0.34) 
Electric Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution   4.41            4.43               4.53         4.23         0.09      1.00 (0.61) 
Natural Gas Distribution       4.40            4.41               4.61         4.22         0.10      0.24 (0.89) 
 
IRR 
Oil and Gas Extraction       8.65          8.66        9.20         8.17         0.34      1.56 (0.46) 
Coal Mining         9.54          9.53               9.63         9.45         0.06      1.85 (0.40) 
Support Activities for Mining      8.01            8.07               8.36         7.57         0.22      1.25 (0.54) 
Electric Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution   9.52            9.44             10.33         9.18         0.40      4.31 (0.12) 
Natural Gas Distribution       7.96            7.69               8.77         7.55         0.46      3.15 (0.21) 
 
Notes:  All variables are in natural logarithms.  SD is the standard deviation.  JB represents the Jarque-Bera test for normality with probability values in parentheses. 
  

 
 
Table 2. Panel Unit Root Tests 
    
Variables LLC  IPS  Fisher-ADF  Fisher-PP   
IND  1.46 (0.93) 0.69 (0.76) 8.65 (0.57)  5.67 (0.84) 
ΔIND            -4.71 (0.00)a    -3.18 (0.00)a 28.78 (0.00)a  32.49 (0.00)a 
 
RCR            -0.95 (0.17)     -1.88 (0.03)b 28.50 (0.00)a  26.38 (0.00)a 
ΔRCR            -7.44 (0.00)a  -----  -----   ----- 
 
IRR            -4.86 (0.00)a -2.94 (0.00)a 35.37 (0.00)a  37.80 (0.00)a 
ΔIRR  -----  -----  -----   ----- 
 
Notes:  Unit root tests include both an intercept and trend.  Probability values are in parentheses with  
significance levels: a(1%) and b(5%).  Null hypothesis is a unit root.  Lag length determined by  
minimizing Akaike information criterion (AIC).  Δ is the first difference operator. 
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Table 3. Panel ARDL Results 
Pooled Mean Group ARDL Model: 
Dependent Variable:  ΔIND 
 
Short-Run Estimates: 
Constant    -8.606 (0.04)b  
 
ECT     -0.141 (0.04)b 
 
ΔRCR      1.725 (0.06)c 
 
ΔIRR      0.614 (0.90) 
 
ΔIRR2     -0.077 (0.79) 
 
Long-Run Estimates: 
RCR     -1.838 (0.04)b 
 
IRR     16.735 (0.02)b 
 
IRR2      -0.851 (0.02)b 
 
Notes:  the Model is an ARDL (1,1,1,1). Pesaran cross-sectional dependence  
test (normal) under the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence is 0.0402 
with a probability value of 0.97, failing to reject the null hypothesis of cross- 
sectional independence.  Probability values are in parentheses.  Significance  
levels:  b (5%) and c (10%). 
 
 
